



# UNODC

**AGENDA ITEM:  
ORGAN AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING, DRUG  
DEALING AND FURTHER RELATED CRIMES IN  
THE CONFLICT ZONES**

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*"It's all begins in the Sky"*

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## 1)Letter from the Secretaries-General

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Honourable participants of ÇAĞDAŞMUN'25,

As the secretary generals of ÇAĞDAŞMUN'25, taking place from November 14th to November 16th, we would like to extend our warm welcome to all participants of this prestigious conference.

Model United Nations conferences are more than just a simple event, it is a torch that shines its light upon a variety of great opportunities, guiding the youth to the future through the brightness it radiates. It grants the opportunity to be in the minds of diplomats and decision makers allowing the participants to learn the ways of decision making and debating, at the same time giving the chance to apply the learnings in real time debates. When organised with utmost care and responsibility, one conference can shape hundreds of individuals into leaders of the future.

In the first official edition of ÇAĞDAŞMUN, our mission is to achieve what most struggle to do: committees with a wide grasp of the past, present and the future, a marvelous organisation team to be in our most perfect form and most importantly, a mission to create space for bright minds to shine the most powerful, hidden gems to come to light for the greatest jewelries and disregarded souls to prove themselves as unignorable leaders.

It all begins in the sky.

With our warmest regards,

Secretary Generals of ÇAĞDAŞMUN'25,  
Mustafa Aslan and Kuzey Karlık.

## 2)Letter from the Under-Secretary-General

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My lovely delegates,

My name is Bedirhan CURA, and I am honored to be your Under-Secretary-General for the UNODC committee in this incredible conference. I truly hope we will be able to produce some meaningful and educational debates throughout our three days together. I will be assisting you in any way that I possibly can, as I have always done with my previous delegates and committees.

Most of the guide is specifically chosen, written, and explained, but I strongly recommend you to conduct your own research regarding the agenda item since we have left out some information knowingly. The reason why we did this is to raise awareness about what is happening in the world especially in the conflict zones, to people who are in bad condition, and to show you what kind of monstrous acts criminals or criminal groups commits. I can promise that when you read those articles about the conditions in conflict zones and those acts, you will not be able to forget it, and sadly, that is the best way to etch this into your brains. Nevertheless, I am able to provide you with every little bit of information regarding this topic, so I will be helping you throughout the committee. Before concluding, I would like to express my gratitude towards the executive board of this conference for giving me the opportunity of being an Under-Secretary-General for this conference, since I have missed being one. Those who are in need of guidance regarding this committee and study guide, can contact me in any way possible, I will return to you when I am available.

Kindest Regards

Bedirhan CURA  
Under-Secretary-General

### **3)Letter from the Academic Assistant**

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Greetings everyone,

Firstly I would like to thank to the Secretariat and Bedirhan Cura for inviting me to this conference as an academic member of the UNODC committee,

Then I would like to continue my letter to mention that our agenda item is quite important for all of us, unfortunately Organ and Human Trafficking, Drug Dealing and Further Related Crimes are just not something that we made up on our mind I wish it was but it is not, so we chose this agenda item in order to show some cruel sides of the humankind, our usg's points are touching the truth so I totally agree with him and repeating him would be pointless since he already told everything that I would like to mention,

I believe if you read this guide carefully and make your further researches upon your delegations' policy you will be present and attentive in the committee,

If you have any questions please feel free to ask anytime via my phone number or gmail address from,

+905522972107

@[baranince88@gmail.com](mailto:baranince88@gmail.com)

Sincerely,

Academic Assistant  
Baran İNCE

## **4)Introduction to the Committee**

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The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime(UNODC) is a United Nations office that was established in 1997 as the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention by combining the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) and the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division in the United Nations Office at Vienna, adopting the current name in 2002.

UNODC was established to assist the UN in better addressing a coordinated, comprehensive response to the interrelated issues of illicit trafficking in and abuse of drugs, crime prevention and criminal justice, international terrorism, and political corruption. These goals are pursued through three primary functions: research, guidance and support to governments in the adoption and implementation of various crime-, drug-, terrorism-, and corruption-related conventions, treaties and protocols, as well as technical/financial assistance to said governments to face their respective situations and challenges in these fields.

The office aims long-term to better equip governments to handle drug-, crime-, terrorism-, and corruption-related issues, to maximise knowledge on these issues among governmental institutions and agencies, and also to maximise awareness of said matters in public opinion, globally, nationally and at community level. Approximately 90% of the Office's funding comes from voluntary contributions, mainly from governments.

These are the main themes that UNODC deals with: alternative development, anti-corruption, criminal justice, prison reform and crime prevention, drug prevention, treatment and care, HIV and AIDS, human trafficking and migrant smuggling, money laundering, organized crime, piracy, terrorism prevention.

## **5)Introduction of the Agenda Item**

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One of the key issues of the UNODC of our age's are Organ and Human trafficking, Drug Dealing and Further Related Crimes in the Conflict Zones

Organ and human trafficking is a great problem by itself and even more when a war comes out and there is a conflict zone drug dealers, organ and human traffickers see it as an

opportunity to take a step in order to traffick humans, organs and drugs because it is a lot harder to detect and stop them,

When it comes to deal drug in the conflict zones it might be hard to transport the drugs and materials of it but it is hard to detect and stop them because of this gap big cartels are opening drug production and dealing centers in the conflict zones because of these factors, wars might affect people's psychology in a bad way most of the people suicide themselves or address drugs because of this demand many producers bring their job to the conflict zones,

As we can see most of the problems are connected with each other and it makes a chain system but if we break this chain at some point the rest of it will break easily,

In this committee the academic team is looking for your solutions in order to see what you really think about the problems which has been mentioned in the agenda item and will be mentioned even much more, nowadays a great number of people doesn't care about the world they live in and if you read this guide, make your further researches about it you will find out that, because many people just care about their life and at some point they have a point but even though we have to stop these crimes, at least we need to try because if we don't this will get out of hand, there are already many non governmental and governmental organizations which focuses to solve the issues but no satisfactory result has been achieved yet, as the academic team this is where we want to see your creativity and realism, do not forget that all of your solutions will be respected no matter what so don't be shy and show your great ideas upon it.

## **6)Human Trafficking in Conflict Zones**

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### **6.1)Introduction**

In 2016, more countries were experiencing some form of violent conflict than at any other time in the previous 30 years. People living in conflict-affected areas may experience abuse, violence and exploitation, including trafficking in persons. The risk of trafficking in persons is also connected with the high numbers of refugees. A need to flee war and persecution may be taken advantage of for exploitation by traffickers. Trafficking in persons in the context of armed conflict has received increased attention by the international community. In November 2017, the United Nations Security Council addressed the topic in Resolution 2388 and reiterated its deep concern that trafficking in persons in areas affected by armed conflict continues to occur. It also underscored that certain offences associated with trafficking in persons in the context of armed conflict may constitute war crimes. Moreover, the Security Council reiterated its condemnation of all acts of trafficking undertaken by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) , Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, the Lord's Resistance Army and other terrorist or armed groups for the purpose of sexual slavery, sexual exploitation and

forced labour. In Resolution 2331 of December 2016, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to take steps to improve the collection of data, monitoring and analysis of trafficking in persons in the context of armed conflict. In response, the present study examines how trafficking in persons occurs in the context of armed conflict through an analysis based on an extensive literature review, a review of case narratives from international tribunals and interviews with personnel from United Nations peacekeeping operations. Trafficking in persons is another dimension of the violence, brutality and abuse that occur in the context of armed conflict. While trafficking takes many forms, it always involves the purpose of exploitation. Victims are trafficked for exploitation in forced labour in different sectors, from agriculture to mines. They are also trafficked to serve as domestic servants, for sexual exploitation or for armed combat. Children are often recruited into armed groups for forced labour in a range of military-related roles. As one expert described it: “when there are armed groups you may find all kinds of exploitation”.

## 6.2) Factors contributing to trafficking in persons in armed conflict

The generalized violence that characterizes conflict areas shapes the conditions for a series of actors, including armed groups, to force or deceive civilians into exploitative situations.

A combination of different elements characterizing armed conflicts increases the risks of trafficking. Armed conflicts amplify the social and economic vulnerabilities of the people affected. In addition, the erosion of the rule of law, which safeguards and protects individuals in peacetime, is one common consequence of armed conflict. The breakdown of state institutions and resulting impunity contribute to generating an environment where trafficking in persons can thrive. Forced displacement is another factor that contributes to an individual's vulnerability to trafficking. In 2017, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that over 68 million people were forcibly displaced because of persecution, conflict, violence or human rights violations. Displaced persons may have limited access to education, financial resources or opportunities for income generation. This provides a fertile environment for traffickers to promise safe migration routes, employment and education or skills training, and deceive them into exploitative situations. Children who are displaced or separated from their families without support networks are particularly vulnerable to becoming targets for traffickers. Discrimination and/or marginalization of minorities compel many to leave family and friends behind in search of safety and protection. The breakdown of social ties and diminishing levels of regular economic activity in conflict settings may force people to search for alternative livelihoods. Trafficking into and out of armed conflicts In conflict areas, trafficking in persons for sexual slavery, recruitment of children into armed groups, forced labour and abduction of women and girls for forced marriages are the most commonly reported forms of trafficking. Armed groups use trafficking as part of their strategy to increase their military power and economic resources, but also to project a violent image of themselves and instill fear in local populations. Armed groups also use sexual violence and sexual slavery as part of their operations. In some conflicts, for example, the

prospect of receiving ‘sex slaves’ as a reward for joining the group is part of the armed groups’ strategies to recruit new fighters. Trafficking in persons related to armed conflict also occurs outside specific conflict areas. This is typically linked to higher levels of vulnerability experienced by people living on the margins of conflict, such as internally displaced persons, refugees and others living in nearby areas affected by armed conflict. In these situations, victims are primarily trafficked for sexual exploitation, forced labour, forced marriages or for multiple forms of exploitation. People using migrant smugglers to flee conflicts may end up as victims of trafficking, coerced into forced labour or sexual exploitation to pay off the smuggler fees.

### 6.3) THE MAIN FORMS OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS IN ARMED CONFLICT

One of the features that characterizes trafficking in persons in armed conflict is that it takes place in the context of high levels of violence and coercion. In conflict situations, traffickers can operate with even less fear of consequences than in peacetime. In environments marked by high levels of violence and abuse, the more frequently reported forms of trafficking in persons include trafficking for sexual exploitation, for sexual slavery, for forced marriages, the recruitment of children into armed groups, and several forms of trafficking for forced labour.

#### Trafficking for sexual exploitation

On a global scale, trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation is the most detected form. Sexual exploitation is a broad category, however, and more specific forms of sexual exploitation have been identified in the context of armed conflict. Among refugees in formal and informal camps and in urban contexts in the Middle East, some families have felt that they had no option but to trade away their daughters for marriage to obtain some money to support the rest of the family. Some may perceive this practice as a way to protect their daughters from sexual and gender-based violence. Some of these marriages resulted in girls and women being coerced into sexual exploitation which would qualify as trafficking in persons. Similarly, families coping with the harsh realities of internally displaced persons and refugee camps, informal settlements and displacement in urban settings, may apply less scrutiny to job offers used by traffickers to recruit young women and girls, and sometimes also boys and men, into sexual exploitation. Such cases have been detected in areas with high levels of vulnerability tied to limited economic opportunities and weak rule of law.

Trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation has also been reported as part of the generalized sexual and gender-based violence that characterizes conflict areas. Women and girls who live in environments where sexual abuse and violence are rife are at increased risk of sexual exploitation including through trafficking. Trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation is also associated with the increased demand for sexual services that often emerges in conflict



areas. This may be due to the deployment of military personnel, particularly when they are comparatively wealthy. Higher demand combined with lack of basic services and economic opportunities for affected civilians provide incentives for trafficking networks to extend their operations into conflict zones or for new networks to develop. For example, the presence of military personnel during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia resulted in an increase of trafficking for sexual exploitation in the region affected by the conflict.

## Trafficking for sexual slavery

Trafficking in persons for sexual slavery may be defined by the character of the relationship between the perpetrator and victim. In international law, slavery is defined as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.” Slavery and practices similar to slavery are forms of exploitation explicitly listed in the UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol. In a recent publication, UNODC explains how trafficking in persons for sexual slavery can constitute crimes against humanity or war crimes. International criminal tribunals have demonstrated that many cases of sexual abuse and violence amount to sexual slavery. Coercion, segregation and violence are often part of the way armed groups perpetrate sexual slavery in different conflicts around the world. Various reports on violence in armed conflict have documented that victims are abducted, held in captivity, and exposed to many forms of sexual abuse, including rape and sexual slavery. Prosecutions of war crimes in the aftermath of the wars in the former Yugoslavia involved cases of sexual violence that included elements that may warrant considering them as trafficking for sexual slavery. In one case, the court documented that a group of women were segregated and repeatedly raped by the captors and coerced into performing domestic chores. Occasionally, they were also coerced into sexual intercourse with others, and eventually sold to other criminals: “After a month [in captivity and sexual abuse] she and the other witness which was a captive as well] were taken away by a certain “Misko” and another man (...). She later learnt that they had been sold for 500 Deutschmarks each and a truckload of washing powder. The men who had bought them mocked them for having been bought at such a price.” The international tribunals have documented similar cases in other conflicts. The narratives of these cases show how these crimes are often carried out with “acts” and “means” that could qualify them as trafficking in persons for sexual slavery. Sexual slavery also occurs in the broader context of conflict-related sexual violence. In 2016, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan recorded hundreds of incidents of conflict-related sexual violence, of which several included elements of trafficking for sexual slavery. Women were abducted by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and sexually enslaved for more than four months, during which they also witnessed the killing of other victims held in captivity.

## Trafficking for forced marriage

Trafficking for the purpose of forced marriage is not explicitly listed as a form of exploitation in the UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol. In the context of forced marriages, which may be understood as a union of two persons in which at least one has not given his or her full and

free consent, the non-consenting partner is often exploited in different ways. This exploitation determines that this phenomenon is trafficking in persons. This type of trafficking mainly targets women and girls, and the type of exploitation leverages on stereotypical gender roles where the wife carries out household duties while experiencing severe forms of violence, abuse and coercion including rape and non-consensual sexual intercourse. This phenomenon has been identified in most armed conflicts in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. In South Sudan, over 40 per cent of the 376 cases of sexual violence in armed conflict recorded in 2016 were registered as cases of forced marriage, with many of the perpetrators being members of armed groups. In some contexts, this practice is part of a strategy of how the group operates. For example, Boko Haram has abducted about 200 young girls from Chibok Community in Borno State with the purpose of forcibly marrying them to fighters followed by other exploitation and abuse. Most of these young girls have been rescued and reunited with their families. In summary, the group has abducted hundreds of girls and coerced many into slavery. Similarly, during the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, members of the armed groups could be 'assigned' a wife. Women and girls were abducted, raped and coerced into servitude as "wives". One of the judgments of the Special Court of Sierra Leone described how commanders managed and organized this type of trafficking in persons: "[The] witness testified that he and other "soldiers" under the command of "Woyoh" captured approximately 35 civilian women during the attack on Karina in June of 1998. The women were initially stripped naked but were later permitted to dress. When the soldiers left Karina they stopped at a temporary base in the jungle. There, Woyoh handed the women over to 'Five-Five' who was the Chief of Staff. 'FiveFive' distributed the women among the soldiers under his command by requiring them to "sign for" a woman. 'FiveFive' stated that if there were any problems the soldiers should immediately report directly to him. He also stated that if the soldiers "disturbed" the women, they would be removed from the soldier's control. The women were "wives to the soldiers" and they remained with their "husbands" until the soldiers invaded Freetown."<sup>35</sup> Women and girls who are trafficked into such 'marriages' are perceived differently than other victims who are trafficked into sexual exploitation or slavery. Women and girls coerced into forced marriages receive a higher status compared to other victims who have been abducted or kidnapped by armed groups. The unambiguous language of the Special Court described how: "... wives were accorded special treatment." The wives were not to be shared with others and were regarded as the sole property of the fighter to whom they belonged. The wives were also part of an organized group system in which one of the captured wives – the "Mammy Queen" – had a responsibility for the 'welfare' of the other wives, which underlines the purpose of this crime. This case shows an advanced level of organization. Lowranking soldiers were tasked with acquiring wives, who were then given to more senior commanders who often had several "wives", indicating a sense of order and status. Trafficking in persons in connection with forced marriages also occurs at the margins of conflict. Poverty may lead some parents to give or trade their daughters for marriage. In the poor socio-economic conditions of some refugee families, having one less dependent to care for and additional income from a dowry payment provide strong economic incentives. In some cases, entering into an early or arranged marital commitment is seen as an acceptable alternative to attending school, especially as attendance and transportation to and from school

can be dangerous during periods of active conflict. Traffickers may take advantage of these vulnerabilities and coerce victims into exploitative situations.

## Trafficking of children into armed groups

Armed groups recruit children to boost military capacity or to add pliant human resources. These ways of using children are regarded as exploitative. Figures from the United Nations Secretary-General's Reports on Children and Armed Conflict documents 7,734 verified cases of children being associated with armed groups in the year 2016. According to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, the recruitment and use of children associated with armed groups nearly always constitutes trafficking in persons. Trafficking of children by armed groups has been documented in conflicts across many regions, including the Middle East, subSaharan Africa and Asia. Recruitment may involve families or communities handing over their children, particularly boys, to join armed groups that share ethnic, religious or territorial ties with these communities. They may do so out of 'a sense' of obligation towards the group, which may be perceived as the authority in charge of community security. Some case material from international tribunals illustrates how armed groups exert pressure on local communities to provide children for military service in response to perceived external threats. In other situations, children join armed groups due to lack of other options, out of a desire for revenge for having lost their families during the conflict or to defend their community. Once enrolled in the groups, children may be prevented from leaving. During the conflict in Sierra Leone, armed groups prevented children from defecting by using violence, threats and sanctions. For example, if children tried to escape, their commanders might burn the letters "RUF" into their skin to deter others from doing the same. The commanders also manipulated victims by infusing narcotics into open wounds. Children are used for armed combat in several ways, often depending on their age and sex. As a general pattern, older children are recruited into armed units to take active part in hostilities, while younger children are used for other tasks. In some cases, younger children are used as body guards or in other supporting roles because they are more obedient and easier to manage. In some armed groups, children account for a large part of their military power. According to some reports, more than half of the members of Al-Shabaab are children, and estimates suggest that over 90 per cent of the members of the Lord's Resistance Army are children. In these groups, as well as some others, child trafficking is used to ensure recruitment. Being trafficked into armed combat may also entail being coerced to carry out suicide bombings. Boko Haram, for example, has used young girls and boys in suicide attacks. UNICEF has documented the use of children as young as eight in suicide attacks. The number of suicide attacks carried out by children against targets in the Lake Chad region increased from 4 in 2014 to 44 in 2015. In a recent publication, UNODC assessed how children are recruited and exploited by terrorist and violent extremist groups. The study explores the various recruitment methods, from propaganda to community pressure, from the use of the internet to economic incentives. The publication also reports on how different profiles are targeted, and on the various forms of exploitation used by these groups for their purposes.

## Trafficking for forced labour

Trafficking in persons for forced labour within conflict areas is typically carried out by armed groups to generate illicit income or sustain military operations. Children associated with armed groups, for instance, are also exploited in various non-combat or ‘support’ roles, such as cooking or carrying out other household chores. They may also be forced to undertake heavy construction work, such as building bridges, roadblocks and camps. Case material from the conflicts in Sierra Leone shows that children were recruited by armed groups and used to gather food, fish, or to work on farms, and at one point, build an airstrip. Trafficking for forced labour also occurs in the margins of hostilities. People living in informal settlements close to the conflict zone, or people travelling along smuggling routes in order to flee the conflict and seek asylum, are also at risk of being trafficked for forced labour. Trafficking in persons for the purpose of forced labour in situations of crisis and State fragility, including in the context of armed conflict, is looked at as part of a broader policy report on forced labour published by the International Labour Office. The report suggests a range of policy measures to address forced labour in its different manifestations and settings, from prevention to victims’ protection, from capacity building to strengthening cooperation.

## Porters

Within areas directly affected by armed conflict, armed groups exploit adults and children to carry heavy equipment. This form of trafficking depends on the military operations carried out by the armed groups. More complex operations demand more labour resources. Where the use of porters is an integrated way of how armed groups move, this practice occurs systematically. For example, in South-East Asia, armed groups force children or adults from some ethnic minorities to carry heavy loads and military equipment up mountainsides and through jungles. In one case, victims reported that they were treated as slaves and the conditions were so harsh some of them died out of fatigue, while others were deliberately killed by the armed groups. In other contexts, porters are key to looting and pillaging. In Central Africa, for example, some armed groups abducted victims, and while being transferred, they were used to “carry stolen goods, equipment and different materials”.

## Extractive industries

Another form of conflict-related trafficking in persons for forced labour involves victims who are coerced into extracting mineral resources to finance the operations of armed groups. This form of trafficking in persons hinges on the availability of abundant natural resources that can be extracted without advanced technology in areas of weak institutional controls. It has been documented in different conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, mainly concerning the mining of diamonds. In some contexts, competition over the control of mineral resources is a central feature of the armed conflict, and the acquisition of people for forced labour at mining sites is an integrated part of the war effort. The socio-economic vulnerabilities that characterize most

conflict areas may also facilitate human trafficking in the extractive sector. Mining sites attract workers who have few alternative livelihood options. Many risk ending up as victims of trafficking to pay back the money borrowed to purchase tools, supplies and food, or because they have ‘inherited’ debt from their families. In some cases, victims are forced to pay a share or amount of their daily wages to traffickers. Those who refuse or fail to pay may be beaten, banned from entering the mines, forced to work for free or imprisoned. This form of trafficking often involves a structured organization that prevents victims from leaving. In the conflict in Sierra Leone, for example, victims exploited for the extraction of diamonds were forced to live in guarded settlements functioning as detention camps.

## Agriculture

Trafficking in persons for forced labour in the agricultural sector has also been documented in the context of armed conflict. Persons fleeing conflict, for example, may risk being trafficked for forced labour on farms during their journeys. Along migration routes, armed groups may abduct migrants travelling through areas affected by conflict and ‘sell’ them for forced labour in agriculture. There have been cases where migrants and refugees died due to the difficult working conditions. In conflict areas, armed groups recruit victims for various forms of forced labour in agriculture. One expert described how armed groups in Central Africa coerce victims into growing maize, yams and bananas, turning human trafficking into an integrated food supply chain for the group. In some cases, victims pursue employment by contacting armed groups independently, to later find themselves segregated and forced to continue working without pay. The Special Court for Sierra Leone described how armed groups active in the conflict in West Africa forced approximately 100 to 500 victims to work at farms. The extensive production resulting from forced labour in agriculture was used for both consumption and trade.

## Service and industry

Traffickers may operate as brokers or recruiters, supplying victims from conflict zones to businesses in surrounding areas. In some contexts, businesses contact traffickers to recruit a certain number of persons for exploitative work. The traffickers facilitate the victims’ transfer out of the conflict zone, where they are exploited in restaurants or other service businesses. Victims receive limited pay and must work exceedingly long hours, and are often subjected to abuse. In conflict zones, victims are also trafficked to provide services in military sites run by national armies. The Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons describes how some subcontractors in charge of catering or other services for military sites in the Middle East use deceptive recruitment practices to traffic persons into conflict zones. These practices include the use of excessive recruitment fees, and the exploitation involves dangerous working conditions, poor living conditions, and underpayment or non-payment of wages. The subcontractors often lie about the destination country, location of work, the conditions of work and living arrangements, and may also retain the workers’ passports, preventing them from leaving.

## Domestic work

Victims are trafficked and exploited for domestic work in and around conflict areas. During a country visit in the Middle East, the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons documented that the lack of economic opportunities is putting Syrian refugees at risk of being trafficked for domestic servitude and other forms of exploitation. Within conflict areas, victims of sexual slavery or forced marriages may be forced to carry out domestic chores.

## **7)Organ Trafficking and Illicit Trade in Human Organs**

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### 7.1)Introduction

Over 140,000 organ transplants are performed each year worldwide, a figure that accounts for only ten percent of the global need for transplantable organs. Undeniably, the demand outpaces the supply, and this unmet need creates a business opportunity for criminal organizations. According to WHO estimates from 2007, five to ten percent of all organ transplants are performed using illegally sourced organs. The actual extent of illegal organ transplants is, however, hard to ascertain because this type of criminality remains clandestine and goes unreported.

Conflict zones are fertile ground for organ traffickers. Displaced populations and refugees are vulnerable and have very few means of supporting themselves. This may cause them to turn to anyone promising financial support, no matter the personal cost. In this context, organ traffickers have been able to profit from the desperation of those affected by armed conflict.

Organ trafficking has turned out to be a lucrative business, not only for criminal organisations, but also for non-State armed groups. Aside from providing a steady flow of revenue for these groups, transplantable organs are also needed to treat injured combatants. These groups typically harvest and sell organs from captured fighters, captives, and hostages, as exemplified by Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) militants in the context of the 1998-1999 Kosovo conflict, and more recently by militants of the Islamic State group.

The international legal community is yet to respond in a way that fully apprehends the various facets of organ trafficking. So far, only two conventions have tackled the issue, in a limited way. On the one hand, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children of the widely accepted United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), only contemplates organ harvesting for the purpose of criminalizing human trafficking, but not organ harvesting in and of itself. On the other hand, the Council of Europe Convention against Trafficking in Human Organs, which contemplates the criminal responsibility of every actor, save for the donor and

recipient, involved in illegal organ harvesting from living and deceased donors, applies only to its parties, the majority of which are members of the Council of Europe. Even if an armed conflict were to arise in territory of parties to those conventions, the void in law enforcement caused by the conflict would likely hinder any attempt to hold organ trafficking groups or their members accountable.

## 7.2) IHL's Prohibition

IHL prohibits illegal organ harvesting during armed conflict through a web of rules that seeks to prevent the exploitation of living and deceased donors. It goes without saying that the prohibition of murder is subsumed under the prohibition of organ harvesting as IHL does not permit the murder of protected persons by removal of vital organs or for the purpose of harvesting organs.

One of the core components of the prohibition of organ harvesting is the regulation of medical procedures by the Additional Protocols (AP) to the Geneva Conventions. These expressly prohibit the removal of tissues or organs for transplantation in international armed conflicts (IACs) (AP I, art. 11) and any medical procedure which is not justified by the protected person's state of health in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) (AP II, art. 5(2)(e)), which inevitably leads to prohibiting organ harvesting. Importantly, save for the exception of Article 11(3) of AP I, organ harvesting cannot be consented to during an armed conflict. Only persons who are excluded from the scope of Article 11 of AP I and Article 5(2)(e) of AP II (i.e. those who are not considered enemy nationals or detained in relation to the armed conflict) may still donate organs within the context of an armed conflict.

Another core component of the prohibition of organ harvesting is IHL's prohibition against mutilation, in both IACs and NIACs, which flows from the Geneva Conventions, notably common Article 3's obligation of humane treatment, as well as the APs (AP I, art. 11 and AP II, art. 4). Removing organs from a person's body is a clear case of mutilation. This has resulted in an expansive protection against organ harvesting for any civilian or person hors de combat, regardless of nationality or allegiance. Based on the International Criminal Court's (ICC) Ntaganda Pre-Trial Chamber interpretation of hors de combat, the prohibition against mutilation could go so far as to protect members of a party's own armed forces, immobilized, or incapacitated at the time their organs are being harvested. This could prove crucial to ensuring that parties to a conflict do not cannibalize their own forces to finance the war effort or treat other combatants.

IHL also protects the bodies of the dead against organ harvesting. Opportunities for organ traffickers to source viable organs in the immediate aftermath of a person's death can be limited by the obligation to search and collect the dead as soon as possible after an engagement. This obligation is also supplemented by an obligation to protect the dead against mutilation and despoliation. While applying the concept of despoliation to human bodies is debatable due to the implications on their legal status and property rights, the prohibition

against mutilating the dead is well rooted in IHL and the international criminal law prohibition of outrages upon personal dignity (1949 Geneva Convention, Common Article 3 and ICC Elements of Crime).

### 7.3) Organ Trafficking Networks as Parties to an Armed Conflict

Despite shortcomings when it comes to tackling organ trafficking, the UNTOC's definition of a criminal organization constitutes a much-needed framework to better characterize the structure of organ trafficking groups. According to Article 2(a) of the UNTOC, criminal groups must display a certain level of organization and be structured for the purpose of obtaining directly or indirectly, a financial or material benefit by committing a crime. An organ trafficking group, traditionally horizontally structured as a network around brokers who recruit donors, recipients, and medically-trained professionals capable of harvesting and transplanting organs, easily satisfies both of those conditions. Within this structure, brokers are at the core and reap the biggest profits, while membership in the group by other protagonists is fluid and will vary based on the needs and location.

However, the fact that an organ trafficking network satisfies those conditions is not sufficient to trigger the applicability of IHL to that group. First, organ trafficking networks are unlikely to constitute an organized armed group (OAG) in a NIAC, as defined by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Trial Chamber Haradinaj case because of their fluid membership and lack of a hierarchically defined and militarily organized structure. Specifically, they tend to lack a command structure with the ability to enforce discipline against all the members of the network and ensure compliance with IHL. In fact, the idea of enforcing IHL in such a situation would run counter to the nature of organ harvesting (i.e. a violation of IHL). Further, the commission of protracted armed violence against the State or another group, a defining characteristic of an organized armed group within the meaning of the ICTY Tadić case, is neither common for organ trafficking networks nor required from a criminal organization under UNTOC. In fact, the success of organ trafficking networks rests on secrecy, discretion, and the evasion – rather than the confrontation – of law enforcement. As such, organ trafficking networks are unlikely to constitute OAGs and hence are not subject to IHL. However, should an OAG establish in-house organ harvesting capabilities, as the Islamic State group and the KLA have done, its actions would fall within the scope of IHL.

As for characterizing an organ trafficking network as a party to an IAC, the situation is even more improbable. First, organ trafficking networks are not States, the *de facto* parties to an IAC. Second, organ trafficking networks cannot fall within the scope of Article 1(4) of AP I, which applies to non-State armed groups engaged in wars of liberation. Indeed, organ trafficking networks within the scope of the UNTOC cannot be politically motivated, to preserve the distinction between criminal organizations and political opposition groups. While this may preclude organ trafficking networks from benefiting from Article 1(4) of AP



I, it also preserves the essence of that provision by ensuring that those engaged in wars of liberation are not labelled as criminals under another international convention.

## 7.4) Establishing Responsibility

Organ harvesting can be carried out directly by the parties to a conflict, whether they be a State or a non-State armed group. In such a case, a violation of IHL would undoubtedly occur, as IHL is binding on States and, admittedly, non-State armed groups. Presumably, the attribution of responsibility would call upon the application of the principles of the international law of State responsibility. However, attributing responsibility might not be as straightforward as it seems. It is complicated by the fact that organ trafficking networks while not bound by IHL, may still be furthering the goals of, and be used by, parties to an armed conflict.

Many challenges stand in the way of attributing the responsibility of organ trafficking networks to parties to an armed conflict. First, the responsibility of non-State armed groups is not contemplated by the International Law Commission Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Indeed, inherent in the definition of non-State armed groups, is the absence of a State capable of bearing formal responsibility for a violation of IHL under international law. Second, even if responsibility could be attributed to such groups by analogy to States, its consequences would remain unclear because IHL only formally provides for a right to reparation against States – not non-State armed groups. Third, another challenge arises from the structure of organ trafficking networks, which are unlikely to meet the threshold of control required for attribution. Indeed, due to their loose structure and fluid membership, the criteria of total dependence and control required of *de facto* State organs would be absent. Likewise, the International Court of Justice's effective control test (Nicaragua case) and the ICTY's more pragmatic overall control test (Tadić case) were not designed to apprehend the acts of horizontally structured networks of loosely connected members that do not follow a military structure or organization.

While the actions of organ trafficking networks are unlikely to give rise to international responsibility, the same might not hold true for the actions of individual members of a network. Although they may be classified as civilians rather than combatants, their actions can be considered as war crimes, provided that they show a sufficient nexus to the armed conflict to be characterized as war crimes (Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Judgment (ICC Trial Chamber, 8 July 2019)). In order to do so, the armed conflict must have at least played a substantial part in the manner in which the crime was committed, as well as its commission and the decision to commit it.

Importantly, the perpetrators must have acted in furtherance of the armed conflict, its goals, and in the context of their official duties. Undeniably, the armed conflict will have played a substantial role in facilitating an organ trafficking network's operations. However, that does not mean that those performing organ harvesting, especially medical professionals, are acting

with a view to serving the ultimate goal of an armed conflict. Organ trafficking networks are motivated by profit, in times of peace as much as in times of war. Yet, as suggested by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Kunarac case, extending the reach of IHL over perpetrators would be possible if one were to also consider that they acted “under the guise of the armed conflict.” Such a view would capture any crime simply catalyzed by the breakdown of the rule of law and could provide some sense of accountability to victims of organ harvesting. Unfortunately, the risk of opening war crimes up to parasitical criminality called for a strict interpretation of this alternative.

## 7.5) Conclusion

Despite an increased awareness and understanding of the intersections between organized crime and armed conflict, a careful balance must be struck between aspirations of accountability under international criminal law and the duty to faithfully and coherently interpret the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. For instance, parties to an armed conflict could harvest organs from their respective civilians, but Article 11 of AP I excludes organ harvesting procedures performed by a party on its own civilians from qualifying as war crimes. Furthermore, going beyond the criminal responsibility of the principal perpetrator (i.e. the one physically harvesting organs) to hold other members of a network accountable would be marred with evidentiary difficulties and jurisdictional obstacles. These challenges would bar any straightforward application of the ICC’s various modes of liability to other members of that group. Regrettably, organ trafficking networks and their members will keep operating without fear of consequences until the international legal community comes forward with a response that fully measures the complexity and urgency of regulating illegal organ harvesting.

## 8) Drug Production and Trafficking in Conflict Zones


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### 8.1) Introduction

Drugs and conflict are almost inextricably interlinked—on the part both of the state and the non-state. Throughout history, many conflict actors have been fuelled by narcotics while conflicts themselves are funded by taxes on the illicit drug economy. While drugs are rarely the reason a conflict begins, there are many contemporary examples of the drug economy prolonging and exacerbating levels of conflict and violence and preventing successful peacebuilding. An analysis of the Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)—the highest ranking global body with regard to peace and security—carried out by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) shows that the drug trade has been a growing concern over the past decade. Of a total of 1,219 UNSC Resolutions passed between 2000 and 2019, drug trafficking was mentioned in 114—around 10 per

cent—and is second only to arms trafficking as the most frequently occurring form of crime. Of particular significance is, as figure 1 clearly shows, that the rate at which drug trafficking is mentioned in resolutions is accelerating. In the period 2010–19, the number of resolutions specifically mentioning drug trafficking exceeded 20 per cent (GI-TOC, 2020a), and the geographic scope of those resolutions significantly increased. Although references in resolutions is an imperfect measure that cannot be assumed to be a proxy for the scale of any illicit market, nor necessarily a reflection of the real-world nature of conflicts on the ground given the politicisation and complexity of the Security Council as a multilateral mechanism (Bish, 2019), the continued and growing recognition of the role of drug trafficking by the world’s highest ranking peacekeeping body is nonetheless noteworthy and significant.

FIGURE 1 Mentions of drug trafficking in UN Security Council Resolutions by region (2000–19).



In their *World Atlas of Illicit Flows*, INTERPOL, GI-TOC, and RHIPTO—the Norwegian Center for Global Analysis—estimate that the proceeds from drug trafficking represents 28 per cent of the income of non-state armed groups and terrorist organisations in zones of conflict around the world. Most of this revenue comes not from the production or distribution of drugs, or from other direct means of involvement in the drug trade, but from the taxing of drugs that transit through territory controlled by criminal groups. This encompasses the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Boko Haram in Nigeria and the various extremist groups in West Africa and the Sahel, among others (RHIPTO, 2018). It has become a well-established assumption that peace, security and development will provide the preconditions for a reduction in levels of violence (Serwer and Thomson, 2008), and it is equally often assumed that the same three factors will reduce illicit activity and criminal behaviour. As a consequence, in the contexts of

many of the conflicts of the past two decades, the challenges of addressing the illicit economy are pushed aside to be resolved after the bigger questions of political settlement are concluded and the peacebuilding track is undertaken (Boutellis and Tiélès, 2019). The drug policy community has remained largely absent or excluded from these debates, and consequently there is surprisingly little literature that addresses why and how drug policy approaches should be considered in a conflict setting. This is perhaps because, in parallel over the same period, the attention of the drug policy community was more focused on the growing challenges of the urban environment, recognising that the countries with the highest levels of homicide and violence were no longer conflict zones, but urban areas beset by organised crime (UNODC, 2019a), and that new approaches were urgently needed to address the urban violence paradigm. While this urgency and imperative were by no means misplaced, the era of armed conflict is far from over, and the damage that actors resourced by the illicit economy can cause is still manifold. Unresolved, protracted, and deadly civil wars are currently raging, with drug production and trafficking fuelling these conflicts. The rise of Captagon production and trafficking over the course of the prolonged conflict in Syria is one notable example (Kravitz and Nichols, 2016); the transit of cocaine through the insurgencies of the Sahel and its trafficking through the ports of Libya is another (Micallef, 2019). Insurgent movements funded by the drug trade remain, in Africa, the Americas and Asia. It has become clear that the world's fragile states and conflict zones are attractive to transnational organised crime groups, which increases the likelihood of continued intersection between narcotics and conflict (RHIPTO, 2018). This policy comment, therefore, seeks to revisit—at a level higher than individual ethnographic research—the question of that intersection, and to examine what a drug policy lens can bring to peacebuilding in these contexts. The article is divided into two sections. The first analyses the features of the illicit drug economy and how those who profit from it operate in situations of conflict. The second section concludes by reflecting on what this means for the way drug policy should be considered and implemented, and whether in fact there is a value to bringing a stronger drug policy approach to conflicts and their resolution. The chapter draws upon the author's nearly two decades of experience as a specialist in organised crime, illicit economies, and conflict zones. As a former United Nations staff member, this included work with the United Nations Development Programme on Afghanistan and Iraq, among other countries, and as a policy specialist in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). As the Deputy Director of the GI-TOC, the author has carried out extensive research on conflicts in Africa and the Middle East—including Syria, Mali and the Sahel, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Somalia and the Horn of Africa—and on the role of the illicit economy in fuelling and furthering those conflicts. In addition, this work offered first-hand involvement in and knowledge of the workings of a number of multilateral, bilateral, and civil society initiatives to address these challenges. The present chapter also benefits from an extensive literature review across multiple continents, drawing from the body of ethnographic scientific research on narcotics and violence, conflict, and peacebuilding, as well as an increasingly rich and insightful set of grey literature produced by independent think tanks and civil society groups often using a political economy approach to analysing the illicit economy.


## 8.2) The Drug Trafficking and Conflict Nexus

The interaction between conflict and narcotics has been observable in the conflicts of every continent. Moreover, even long after those conflicts are purportedly resolved, the negative ramifications can still be felt and usually over a wider geographic region than the original conflict epicenter. Illicit economies and the groups that enable them have proven themselves to be highly durable, adaptive and prone to expanding their theatres of operation. Almost all of the world's heroin supply is created in the conflict zone that is Afghanistan. The two-decade-long struggle to address the nexus between poppy cultivation and 'warlordism', corruption and underdevelopment in Afghanistan—described by Mansfield—is one example of this interaction. Similarly, many of the longer-standing and best known narcotic-fuelled conflicts have been concentrated in producer regions, including Colombia, where coca production was a resource for the FARC military insurgency (Felbab-Brown, 2005), and in Myanmar, where opium production funded the civil war and has left a legacy of chaos and criminality in the Shan State borderlands (Cowell, 2005). The intersection between conflict and production—in these cases and in other regions—triggered a range of policy and programmatic options that focused on alternative development for those dependent on cultivation for their livelihoods. These programmes enjoyed limited success, with some criticism levelled at the alternative development approaches. For example, in an earlier chapter of this Thematic Issue, Buxton claims that they failed to tackle the root causes of drug production and that they were seldom integrated into a more holistic strategy to address the broader illicit economy and the actors within it (Buxton, Chapter 2, this issue). Greater harm, however, was caused by the application of established counter-narcotics doctrine including heavy-handed eradication campaigns. These not only failed to meaningfully reduce funding to the armed militias and belligerent groups that the drug trade was financing, but in some notable cases actually strengthened popular support for those groups (Felbab-Brown, 2009). These criticisms are discussed in other chapters in this volume. An issue of greater concern to the peacekeeping and peacebuilding communities emerged, however, over the next decade or so when it became apparent in contexts such as Guinea-Bissau and Mali that a transit trade in illicit narcotics was a significant contributor to state failure. Neither of these countries were drug production areas, or even particularly prominent trafficking zones, yet the profits of drug trafficking have proven potently destabilising and have played a role in the development of unprecedented forms and levels of violence. The profits of the drug trade reached into the uppermost levels of governments, with complex networks that had overlapping political, business and social interests (ICG, 2018; Shaw, 2015). The profits of trafficking allowed militants to buy arms and political influence (Tinti, 2014), which created enormous challenges for navigating a peace process or political transition. In the context of these conflicts, however, the heavy prior emphasis on alternative development meant that the toolbox was largely empty when it came to addressing the governance and developmental implications of the drug trade outside of a cultivation zone. The international and multilateral system, preoccupied with negotiating the politics of the transition, preferred to silo the complex and corrosive impacts of the drug trade as a security threat to be assigned to law enforcement or even military actors, and the public health and harm reduction consensus appears to break down where there is a perceived intersection between criminality and conflict, which often justifies a hard line of law enforcement or even militarised approaches to breaking that nexus. This has been particularly exacerbated in cases such as Mali and

Afghanistan, where armed militants involved in the drug trade are also accused of terrorism. Focusing on the link between narcotics and terrorism further securitised law enforcement efforts and intelligence gathering to the point that the war on drugs and the war on terror became interlinked, and that ‘the traditional separation of narcotics and terrorism counter measures and agencies has gradually faded since 9/11’ (Björnehed, 2004, 313). The criminal justice-led approaches prescribed by the international narcotics control regime proved both ineffective and damaging in weak states with limited law enforcement capacity, where the integrity of both leadership and serving officers was easily or already compromised (Aning and Pokoo, 2014), and—more importantly—where the actors involved in the illicit economy had a degree of legitimacy in their communities (Reitano and Hunter, 2016). What we have learned, moreover, is that criminal agendas and the political landscape intersect in many different ways, so that separating criminal and conflict actors is a naive objective (Bosetti et al., 2017) that fails to account for the violent-governance paradigm.

Conflict zones and poorly managed post-conflict transitions offer many opportunities for those that are well resourced and comfortable using violence to achieve their own objectives and consolidate power while state institutions are weak (Shaw and Reitano, 2017). This is due to the quintessential nature of armed conflict regardless of the ideology or interest that might have sparked the conflict: that it is a competitive fight for power and influence that uses violence. During the lifespan of a conflict what is therefore created can be termed a ‘violent-governance paradigm’—a mutually reinforcing cycle where political leverage is achieved through access to resources that have value or can be monetised; where resources buy the support of local communities through the provision of livelihoods and access to existing political influence (through corruption); and where resources also buy access to arms and foot soldiers (militias, armies or paid security or ‘heavies’), which in turn can be used to pressure or attack the opposition, erode a monopoly on violence, secure control of territory and assets, or extort support from local populations (Figure 2).

FIGURE 2 The violent-governance paradigm.



To describe this in another way—one that is perhaps better grounded in the established governance literature—a conflict is a sovereignty challenge, where sovereignty is defined as ‘a tentative and always emergent form of authority grounded in violence that is performed and designed to generate loyalty, fear, and legitimacy from the neighbourhood to the summit of the state’ (Blom Hansen and Stepputat, 2006). This definition justifies the right to sovereignty (either locally or nationally) for any group that wields violence to create legitimacy (Stepputat, 2018). There are strong parallels between this definition of sovereignty and the techniques via which criminal groups operate to secure access to and control over illicit markets (Tilly, 1985). Mafia-style organised crime groups similarly use violence or the threat of violence to secure control over territory and resources and ensure the compliance of those living within their territory, to intimidate communities and authority figures, and to extract criminal rents (Varese, 2017). Violence is the means by which competition within and between organisations is played out, internal discipline is ensured, threats to the group are overcome, and reprisals are carried out (Reuter, 2009). Even in a conflict zone where the monopoly on violence is contested, a government may have significant capabilities with regard to the use of force in response to security challenges. But legitimacy and violence do not always equate directly to one another. Where the legitimacy of the state using force is compromised, by corruption or the perception that the use of force was illegitimate, then non-state actors have the capacity to build their own legitimacy with the communities in which they are embedded (Idler and Forest, 2015). They can do this by using violence to secure access to resources and to earn criminal rents through the creation of protection economies (Shaw, 2016b), and then distributing part of those rents and other services to the benefit of the communities. Criminal groups across the world provide concrete goods to

communities, but also deliver services, from security and justice to social and public goods such as health, education and humanitarian relief (Cockayne, 2007). In a conflict zone all the same principles apply, but the provision of physical security to groups who feel persecuted by the state is a particularly potent means by which armed groups can challenge state authority and build the loyalty of the community (McLoughlin, 2009). If the conflict is driven by the perception that state resources are being unjustly captured and retained by the government or elites and that livelihoods for ordinary people are being provided through the illicit economy, then a Robin Hood syndrome can come into play, in which criminal actors are the ones redistributing wealth and rebalancing justice that has been distorted by the state (Martinez-Gugerli, 2018), earning them even more social capital. With trust and legitimacy with local populations established, these populations may offer protection and coverage for criminal groups, giving them a stronghold from which to plan and carry out their operations (Reitano and Hunter, 2016). More importantly, however, legitimacy can strengthen their political capital within a framework of disputed authority, building up criminally financed actors as viable players in conflict negotiations and giving them a seat at the table. The violent-governance paradigm highlights the interdependence between violence, legitimacy, and access to resources, and that responses targeted at reducing any single one of these levers are likely to prove inadequate. Even where violence levels can be reduced through mediation, for example, access to resources, local legitimacy, and the constant threat of a return to violence can maintain the status quo. The gang truces negotiated in El Salvador illustrate this point very clearly (Dudley, 2013), as do the consistent failures of efforts with regard to ceasefires and 'cantonment' in Mali (Boutellis, 2015). In fact, as armed groups consolidate control over territory and populations, violence levels may fall (or change) as the threat of violence and of symbolic hits becomes sufficient to keep civilians aligned to their authority (Catino, 2014). Constraining groups' access to resources is another strategy put forward as a means to undermine the potency of armed groups that are criminally resourced. Upstream interdiction efforts to cut off drug supply chains and the freezing or seizure of criminal assets are the primary responses proposed by law enforcement to the challenge of addressing drug trafficking and the illicit economy more broadly. Yet both strategies are notoriously weak in the best case scenarios—surveillance and interdiction affect only a tiny fraction of total global flows of narcotics (UNODC, 2019b); the prohibitive costs, legal constraints and regulatory requirements of anti-money laundering regimes and asset seizure make this a symbolic rather than a practical tool (Reuter and Truman, 2004)—rendering them almost nonsensical in a conflict setting where there is no meaningful state institution to support those frameworks. Furthermore, armed groups with territorial control are able to build their resource base opportunistically from any other licit or illicit resource flow, and through protection taxation on local populations (RHIPTO, 2018; Reitano et al., 2017). is required is a simultaneous, coordinated and long-term effort to reduce all three aspects of the



Points in Western Europe. “Night shops” that are open for lengthy hours in Belgium are centers of the drug trade. These night shops are also linked to human smuggling networks whose clients have even included smuggled Chinese (Centre pour l’égalité 2008). The personnel employed by the Balkan crime groups may run brothels and move drugs. In Belgium, the Albanians use the madams, usually women with EU passports who control their trafficked women, also as drug couriers (Arsovska and Janssens 2009: 184). A similar overlap is seen in Eastern organized crime. The Russian organized crime group named Solnstevo crime group had an important role in Hungary linking the drug and human trade from the former Soviet Union to Eastern Europe (Varese 2011). One of its key figures, Semyon Mogilevich, figured significantly in the Bank of New York case in which large illicit flows were located in this American bank tied to his criminal activities. Latin America, as previously mentioned, is where drug trafficking organizations are diver-sifying into human trafficking. This has occurred as a result of the tightening of borders. Controls on the US-Mexican border and the demand for more sophisticated traffickers to move individuals across the border. Furthermore, the corruption of border personnel by the drug trafficking organizations allows them to move people across the border. The drug traffickers moving into human trafficking consist of both Central American gangs such as MS-13 and established Mexican drug trafficking organizations (Statement of Swecker 2006, Wuebbel 2004 ). Those subject to particular exploitation are those who are transiting Mexico on the way to the United States from Central America. In August 2010, 72 human beings smuggled through Mexico on the way to the United States were killed by a drug trafficking organization when they refused to join it. Drug trafficking organizations hold these transiting migrants for ransom and try to extract money from family members in the United States (Wola and Center Prodh 2010). The presence of members of drug trafficking organizations in 200 communities in the United States makes this coercion more feasible. Linkages in other areas of trafficking can be seen between the drug and human trades. Infant trafficking exists in areas where organized crime is centered—Mexico City and Tijuana. Midwives often persuade poor mothers to sell their children, or deceive them by telling them that their babies have an illness or have died. Sometimes they even drug mothers and steal their babies in order to sell them (Bosco et al. 2009:57). The links between the drug and human trade become very evident in the analysis of the United States where the diverse forms of convergence of the drug and human trade becomes evident. North America Drugs and human trafficking are linked in the United States and Canada although the problems are most acute in the United States. Because of the proliferation of Latin American drug trafficking organizations and gangs throughout the US.

Other drug groups than the Latin Americans have been observed engaging in both forms of illicit activity including but not limited to Post-Soviet crime groups, American pimps, and US motorcycle groups. One of the first cases in which a defendant was prosecuted for human trafficking linked post-Soviet organized crime with Latin American drug traffickers. Ludwig Fainberg also known as “Tarzan” used trafficked women as bait for Colombian drug traffickers who frequented his strip joint near the Miami airport. Fainberg and his Colombian associate even ventured to Russia to buy submarines and missile launchers from a Russian military base in the North that could be used to ensure the delivery of drugs (Friedman 2000). Violent and multi-member gangs such as MS-13 have entered the human smuggling business since 2001 and the tightening of border controls because large profits can be made by moving hundreds of thousands of men and women annually (Swecker 2006). These human smugglers can force people they transport across the border to carry drugs to “pay” See the report on the website of the National Drug Intelligence Center, [http://wn.com/National\\_Drug\\_Intelligence\\_](http://wn.com/National_Drug_Intelligence_) (accessed July 13, 2011). Friedman is one of the few authors to write on this case that first linked drugs and human trafficking in a federal indictment. In the late 1990s when this investigation occurred, the Trafficking in Persons Act was not yet law. Therefore, there was no one who asked the Russian speaking undercover agent to find the human trafficking. But the extensive bruises on the strippers’ bodies as well as his conversations with the women who worked in the club revealed that the women were not voluntarily working in the club but were victims of human trafficking. This fact was mentioned in the charges but did not figure in the prosecutor’s case presented in court. The author conducted interviews with the undercover agent, the prosecutor and examined the court record. The Relationship of Drug and Human Trafficking for their transport. Gangs not only facilitate labor smuggling and trafficking; presently, 55 percent of identified Latin American gangs are now involved in prostitution (Statement of Swecker 2005). Deported members of these gangs now operate on the Mexican-Guatemalan border in the state of Chiapas, where they have established a smuggling operation for persons, drugs, and weapons. They also prey on Latin America brothels in the United States. For example, in a case in the Washington, DC suburb of Montgomery County, gang members used force against the prostitutes to extract their daily earnings before they were collected by their traffickers. The drug trade can be linked to both sexual and labor trafficking. For example, In a case prosecuted in Oregon in 2006 a woman was trafficked from Mexico to cultivate marijuana. This forced labor in the drug industry was combined with beatings, stabbings, and sexual assault as well as being coerced to witness acts of violence committed upon other children and women. Those profiting from the drug trade may also become active customers in the sex markets. Truckers who move money and drugs along the main artery from the United States to Mexico have more disposable income and are using trafficked minors. An example of this is the Stormy Nights case from Oklahoma where federal investigators discovered a loose network of 48 pimps who recruited more than 100 girls from Oklahoma City and moved them along trucking routes to Denver, Miami, Houston, and Dallas, thousands of miles from their homes (Statement of Chris Swecker 2005). Drugs are used by American pimps to compel young girls into prostitution and to force them to turn over all their wages. An indictment of a group of pimps in Atlanta, Georgia revealed that they functioned as a network controlling the group of young girls to whom they provided drugs to be totally subservient and relinquish all

of their earnings. Conclusion The links between the drug trade and human trafficking are numerous and complex. These links are different dependent on the type of human exploitation involved and the region of the world in which the exploitation occurs. Different linkages exist in Africa where children are trafficked as child soldiers and provided drugs to perform violent acts from those found in Europe where criminal organizations traffic both drugs and people for sexual and labor exploitation. In North America, powerful drug trafficking organizations, facing increasing competition and stiff penalties if caught have moved into human trafficking to diversity and reduce risk. There is no universal relationship between drugs and human trafficking. The only general principle applicable to this relationship is that drugs increase the submission and passivity of human trafficking and ensures that they are less likely to free themselves from this abusive relationship. Different drugs are used by traffickers for different purposes to increase dependence and enhance productivity. The diversification of drug trafficking organizations into the business of human traffick-ing has added larger and more violent actors to the phenomenon of human trafficking.

Groups working in more than two commodities, routes, facilitators and transport links can be exploited more effectively. Corruption remains key to human trafficking as it is to the drug trade. The expansion of drug traffickers into the human smuggling and trafficking business is explained by the limited sanctions, high profits and the reduced risk of confiscation of assets. This suggests that the present law enforcement policies that target human and drug traffickers separately are not based on an existing and developing reality in many regions of the world. Therefore, anti-trafficking efforts can be made much more effective by using some of the resources that are presently deployed against drug traffickers—intelligence, task forces and coordinated operations to combat the networks and organizations that traffic in both human beings and drugs.

## **10)International-Regional Responses and Case Studies**

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### **10.1)International Level**

#### **Declaration of Istanbul**

As a consequence of the widespread shortage of organs and the increasing ease of Internet communication, organ trafficking and transplant tourism have become global problems accounting for an estimated 10% of organ transplants that are performed annually around the world. Organ trafficking, transplant tourism and transplant commercialism threaten to undermine the nobility and legacy of transplantation worldwide because of the reality associated with these practices - the vulnerable in resource poor countries (such as the illiterate and impoverished, undocumented immigrants, prisoners, and political or economic refugees) are exploited for their organs as a major source of organs for the rich patient-tourists

who are prepared to travel and can afford to purchase organs.

The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC, also called the Palermo Convention)

The convention was adopted by a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on 15 November 2000.

The Convention came into force on 29 September 2003. According to Leoluca Orlando, Mayor of Palermo, the convention was the first international convention to fight transnational organized crime, trafficking of human beings, and terrorism.

In 2014, the UNTOC strengthened its policies regarding wildlife smuggling. Botswana signed the Anti-Human Trafficking Act of 2014 to comply with UNTOC on the human smuggling protocol.

In 2017, as Japan prepared the organization of the 2019 Rugby World Cup, and the 2020 Summer Olympics and Paralympics, it faced the issue of not being fully compliant with the UNTOC, thus jeopardizing its eligibility to organize those events.

In February 2018, Afghanistan introduced a new penal code which made the country's laws UNTOC-compliant for the first time.

The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances

The 1988 Convention was introduced following the political and sociological developments in the 1970s and 1980s. The growing demand for cannabis, cocaine, and heroin for recreational purposes, mostly in the developed world, triggered an increase of illicit production in geographical areas where cannabis, coca, and opium had been traditionally cultivated. With the rising size of the illicit drug trade, international drug trafficking became a multibillion-dollar business dominated by criminal groups, providing grounds for the creation of the 1988 Convention and the consequential escalation of the war on drugs.

The Preamble notes that previous enforcement efforts have not stopped drug use, warning of "steadily increasing inroads into various social groups made by illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances." It cautions that the drug trade and related activities "undermine the legitimate economies and threaten the stability, security and sovereignty of States." The sense of urgency is underscored by the image of innocent boys and girls being exploited: [C]hildren are used in many parts of the world as an illicit drug consumers market and for purposes of illicit production, distribution and trade in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which entails a danger of incalculable gravity.

## 10.2)Regional Level

### Africa

CONSULTANCY SERVICES FOR THE EVALUATION AND REVISION OF THE 2006 OUAGADOUGOU PLAN OF ACTION TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS, ESPECIALLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AFRICA

The 2006 Ouagadougou Plan of Action on the Prevention of Human Trafficking especially on Women and Children (the Ouagadougou Plan of Action) was adopted by Member States to address the crime in Africa. Among the cardinal premise of the Ouagadougou Action Plan is that measures to prevent and combat trafficking in human beings should be based on respect for human rights including protection of victims, and should not adversely affect the rights of victims of trafficking. Moreover, the best interest of the child, including as recognized in existing international conventions, shall be considered paramount at all times. The Action Plan provides specific recommendations to be implemented by RECs and Member States using the four-pronged approach of Prevention, Protection, Prosecution and Partnership to combat trafficking in persons.

### Asia-Pacific

ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children The ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children is a regional, legally binding agreement between the ASEAN states. It was signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia by the relevant heads of state on 21 November 2015.

This ASEAN Plan of Action, which complements the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP), aims to provide specific action plans within ASEAN Member States' domestic laws and policies, as well as relevant international obligations, to effectively address regional challenges common to all ASEAN Member States in the identified major concerns, to wit: Prevention of trafficking in persons; Protection of victims; Law enforcement and prosecution of crimes of trafficking in persons; and Regional and International cooperation and coordination.

### Americas

The Organization of American States (OAS)

OAS is a regional multilateral organization that comprises 34 of the 35 independent countries of the Western Hemisphere, including the United States; Nicaragua withdrew from the organization in 2023. The OAS was established in 1948 as a forum for Western Hemisphere

countries to engage one another and address issues of mutual concern. Today, the organization concentrates on four broad objectives: democracy promotion, human rights protection, economic and social development, and regional security cooperation. With budget expenditures totaling \$167.0 million in 2024, the OAS carries out various activities to advance these goals, often providing policy guidance and technical assistance to member states.

## Europe

The Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings is a regional human rights treaty of international human rights law by the Council of Europe

To prevent and combat all forms of human trafficking, including, but not limited to sexual exploitation and forced labour, whether national or transnational, whether or not connected with organised crime;

to protect and assist victims and witnesses of trafficking;  
to ensure effective investigation and prosecution,  
to promote international co-operation against trafficking.

In particular, the Convention requires national co-ordination measures, awareness raising, measures to identify and support victims and a "recovery and reflection period" during which trafficked persons will not be expelled from the receiving state.

The Convention establishes a monitoring mechanism (the Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, or GRETA) consisting of 10 to 15 members elected by the states parties.

The Convention opened for signature on 16 May 2005, and entered into force on 1 February 2008. As of October 2023, it has been ratified by 47 European states and Israel. Every member state in the Council of Europe has ratified the treaty. Belarus, a non-Council of Europe state, acceded to the convention in 2013. The convention is also recalled by the Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence.

In 2021, Israel, a non-member state of the Council of Europe, joined the convention, becoming the first country outside of Europe to do so.

## Middle East

Arab League Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2010)

The League of Arab States established the Arab Convention against Transnational Organised

Crime on 21 December 2010. The main aim of the Convention is to strengthen Arab cooperation in preventing and combating transnational organised crime. The Convention applies to prevention, investigation and prosecution of certain offences related to Organised Criminal Groups where the offence is transnational. This Practice Note will provide a general and non-exhaustive overview of the main and most relevant provisions of the Convention and the legal framework established by the League of Arab States for cooperation against transnational organised crime.

## **11)Future Outlook and Ethical Considerations**

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### **11.1)Future Outlook**

A new era of global instability has intensified challenges in addressing the world drug problem, empowering organized crime groups and pushing drug use to historically high levels, says the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in the World Drug Report 2025 launched today.

“This edition of the World Drug Report shows that organized drug trafficking groups continue to adapt, exploit global crises, and target vulnerable populations,” said Ghada Waly, Executive Director of UNODC. “We must invest in prevention and address the root causes of the drug trade at every point of the illicit supply chain. And we must strengthen responses, by leveraging technology, strengthening cross-border cooperation, providing alternative livelihoods, and taking judicial action that targets key actors driving these networks. Through a comprehensive, coordinated approach, we can dismantle criminal organizations, bolster global security, and protect our communities.”

316 million people used a drug (excluding alcohol and tobacco) in 2023, or six per cent of the population aged between 15 and 64, compared to 5.2 per cent of the population in 2013. With 244 million users, cannabis remains the most widely used drug, followed by opioids (61 million), amphetamines (30.7 million), cocaine (25 million) and ecstasy (21 million). New groups of vulnerable people fleeing hardship, instability and conflict could cause these numbers to increase further, the report warns.

The report includes special chapters on drug trafficking and organized crime; the impact of drug use on the health of people who use drugs, their families, communities, and society; and the impact of drugs on the environment in Europe.

### **Global cocaine market breaking its own records**

Production, seizures, and use of cocaine all hit new highs in 2023, making cocaine the world’s

fastest-growing illicit drug market. Illegal production skyrocketed to 3,708 tons, nearly 34 per cent more than in 2022. Global cocaine seizures reached a record high at 2,275– a 68 per cent rise over 2019-2023. Use of cocaine, meanwhile, has grown from 17 million users in 2013 to 25 million users in 2023.

Cocaine traffickers are breaking into new markets across Asia and Africa, the report notes. The vicious violence and competition characterizing the illicit cocaine arena, once confined to Latin America, is now spreading to Western Europe as organized crime groups from the Western Balkans increase their influence over the market.

## Synthetic drug market continues to expand

Due to factors like low operational costs and reduced risks of detection, the synthetic drug market continues to expand globally, dominated by Amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) like methamphetamine and amphetamine (including “captagon”). Seizures of ATS reached a record high in 2023 and accounted for almost half of all global seizures of synthetic drugs, followed by synthetic opioids, including fentanyl.

The fall of the Assad regime in Syria has created uncertainty around the future of the captagon trade. Following the political transition, large captagon manufacturing sites in the country were uncovered. Though the discovery could possibly disrupt the drug’s supply, the latest seizure data from 2024 and 2025 confirm that captagon is continuing to flow -primarily to countries of the Arabian peninsula – possibly indicating the release of previously-accumulated stockpiles or continued production in different locations.

## Drug trafficking brings in staggering profits

Though estimates vary, the illicit drug trade generates hundreds of billions of dollars per year. Criminal groups innovate constantly, through boosting production, finding new ways to chemically conceal their drugs, and using technology to conceal communications and increase distribution.

Though resilient, organized criminal networks can be disrupted – but a deeper understanding of the aims and structures of drug trafficking groups is required. Mapping criminal groups can highlight their vulnerabilities, key actors, enablers, and pinpoint possible areas for intervention. Law enforcement agencies could also consider investing in technology and skills training that matches the sophistication of tools used in the drug supply chain.

## Impact of drug use

Drug use disorders already impose a huge cost on individuals, communities, and health systems, and the rising turn away from multilateralism and reallocation of resources could intensify the problem, the report notes.



The cost of failing to tackle drug use disorders is steep – nearly half a million deaths and 28 million healthy years of life lost due to disability and premature deaths (DALY) in 2021. Just one in 12 people with drug use disorders were estimated to have received any form of drug treatment in 2023. Factors such as policies and availability of evidence-based health and social services can help mitigate the health impact of drug use on people and communities.

## How drugs affect the environment

The report finds that drug use; drug cultivation and trafficking; and the policy responses enacted to address illicit drug economies are all impacting the environment in Europe. Potential consequences of drug cultivation/production can include deforestation and other land-use change as well as air, land and water pollution – which can be significant at the local level.

The number of dismantled clandestine drug laboratories increased in Europe between 2013 and 2023. This manufacture produces significant amounts of waste and can result in considerable clean-up and ecosystem restoration costs. Nevertheless, the report finds that environmental harm is not a priority when designing and implementing drug policy responses, and that much of the waste and other environmental impacts are unaccounted for.

## 11.2) Ethical Considerations

Trafficking in persons for the purpose of organ removal is one of the least understood but growing forms of trafficking worldwide. Countries in the Middle East, Asia, and the Americas are often widely criticized as organ trafficking sites by the international transplant community. However, we must also consider other regions when discussing the issue of organ trafficking. All countries involved in organ transplant tourism worldwide have vulnerable populations that may be exploited; hence, they have the potential for illegal organ trade and may turn a blind eye to profit-making practices. Therefore, medical institutions in every country worldwide should pay due attention to the issue of organ trafficking to begin to address this global inequity.

A recent international case of human trafficking for the purpose of obtaining organs has once again triggered a heated debate on organ trafficking in the international academic world. What is particularly special about this case is that it not only covers transnational human trafficking, organ trafficking, and illegal organ transplant interest chains, but also involves the participation of national political officials and complex social and human factors. On May 5, 2023, Ike Ekweremadu, a Nigerian senator and former deputy president of the Nigerian Senate, was sentenced to more than 9 years in a United Kingdom (UK) prison for his part in a conspiracy to trade on the “poverty, misery and despair” of vulnerable people, which is considered as a slavery and human trafficking offense under the 2015 UK Modern Slavery Act. His wife and Dr. Obinna Obeta, who brokered the organ sale, were also convicted. The

Ekweremadu case is the first in the UK to result in an organ trafficking conviction.

As defined by the United Nations, organ trafficking refers to the control of potential donors through the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, kidnaping, fraud, deception, abuse of power or position of weakness, or the giving or receiving of money or benefits for the purpose of obtaining organs, tissues, or cells for transplantation. Although not all medical tourism that requires cross-border travel by organ transplant recipients or donors is organ trafficking, organ transplant tourism has connotations of organ trafficking. The trafficked victim in this international case was a 21-year-old man who sold telephone parts for a living in Lagos, Nigeria. The intended recipient of the organ was Ekweremadu's daughter, Sonia Ekweremadu, who had severe and worsening renal disease.

The UK government allowed living organ donation between relatives or acquaintances until 2004 but removed this restriction when the 2004 Human Tissue Act was enacted to allow organ donation for strangers. However, no payments were made to the recipient or donor. In 2008, the Declaration of Istanbul on organ trafficking and transplant tourism was developed at the Istanbul Summit on Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism in Istanbul to provide guidelines to prevent the commercialization of organ transplant services using the poor and vulnerable as sources of organs for the rich. The Declaration of Istanbul Custodian Group was established to follow up the achievements and progress in meeting the Declaration of Istanbul's goals.

In 2018, the Declaration of Istanbul Custodian Group updated the Declaration of Istanbul to encompass organ trafficking and transplant tourism, stating that “trafficking in human organs and trafficking for the purpose of removing organs should be prohibited and criminalized.” In addition, the Group emphasized that “health professionals and healthcare institutions should assist in preventing and addressing organ trafficking, trafficking in persons for the purpose of organ removal, and transplant tourism.” In the Ekweremadu case, the relevant personnel at the Royal Free Hospital in London played a key role in terminating the case for organ procurement. The defendant tried to persuade the Royal Free Hospital medical staff to consider the trafficked person as Sonia Ekweremadu's cousin to facilitate the organ donation. However, Dr. Peter Dupont, a consultant at the Royal Free Hospital, raised questions after learning that the proposed donor was unaware of the organ transplant procedure and lacked the required life-long health insurance. Dr. Dupont consequently deemed the individual ineligible for organ donation, which led to the suspension of organ procurement and transplantation procedures.

Economic exploitation and physical mutilation often occur during the process of organ trafficking and organ transplant tourism. Although countries around the world have basically achieved consensus in strictly prohibiting the sale of human organs and advocating for voluntary, unpaid donations to increase the supply of organs for transplantation, the demand for organs available for transplantation is far higher than the supply; therefore, the organ black market is still thriving worldwide. It has been estimated that up to 10% of kidney transplants worldwide involve organ trafficking. The illegal trade in organ trafficking considers the

human body and its parts as commodities. Regardless of the behavior or method of providing or giving economic incentives or paying money for organ transplantation, organ trafficking violates respect for human beings in addition to basic ethical values. Thus, trafficking for the purpose of obtaining human organs leads to wider exploitation of vulnerable groups and global social problems.

It is particularly important to note that for all organ or human trafficking crimes, the consent of the trafficked person cannot be considered as an ethically and legally defensible reason for the crime. In this case, whether the trafficking victim knew about the transnational organ sale was irrelevant to the conviction and sentencing of Dr. Obeta and the Ekweremadu. From an ethical perspective or legal principles, individuals do not have the right to allow other people to exploit them and trade their bodies and organs. This behavior is based on the exploitation of poor and vulnerable groups at the cost of selling human dignity and intrinsic value; therefore, it is not ethically defensible or acceptable for society as a whole.

Over the years, international organizations and many countries have formulated guidelines and the corresponding laws and regulations based on bioethical principles to prohibit commercial organ transplants and trafficking, which have been implemented to a certain extent. However, the problem of organ trafficking persists and there is still much room for improvement. The continued increase in the number of illegal organ transplants can be attributed to ineffective legislation, weak enforcement, and the lure of large profits. However, the mere enacting of laws and inconsiderate policy actions often have limitations, operational defects, cannot fundamentally solve the problem, and may also bring more negative risks. For example, a study of efforts to ban illicit organ trade from a criminological perspective suggests that legal bans do not necessarily eliminate the problem and reduce illegal activity. Instead, they potentially shift criminal activity to other areas, which drives underground trade and leads to higher crime and victimization rates. Therefore, the feasibility and effectiveness of both international and domestic policies and interventions should be considered fully.

In addition, more attention should be paid to the special role and potential influence of medical professionals in this issue. Some researchers suggest that organ trafficking cannot occur without the involvement of medical professionals. The prohibition of acts that include mediation or other facilitation of organ trafficking, including for medical purposes, is also emphasized in the Declaration of Istanbul. In addition, health professionals and health-care facilities should help to prevent and address these problems.

The problems of organ trafficking and commercial organ transplants cannot be solved by relying only on a single country's legislation or law enforcement. Successful enforcement may help crack down on the visible part of the iceberg of organ trafficking networks, but it will not fundamentally affect crime rates. All governments should consider more comprehensive and adequate programs to address these challenges, which are not limited to incentives for cadaver organ donation but should also include phased reflections on intervention policies or strategies, exploring targeted substantial issues, promoting broader public participation and discussion, providing diversified education, and promoting scientific and technological

research progress to prevent organ trafficking activities. Otherwise, the problem will persist and may be exacerbated in various disguised ways.

This case provides a resource for the work of organ donation and transplants in China. First, informed consent is a necessary condition but is not sufficient. During the process of providing informed consent for living organ donation, it is not only necessary to obtain the donor's consent, but also to assess the extent of any possible harm to human beings. Second, any incentive policy for organ donations must undergo ethical assessments. Due to cognitive limitations in addition to the influence or limitations of other factors in the social environment, policies cannot be considered comprehensive when introduced. However, policies can be improved gradually to solve emergent problems and close any loopholes. Especially considering intervention strategies to increase the rate of organ donation, financial incentives or disguised economic incentives cannot be defended ethically. Prof. Alexander Capron illustrated three relationships between donation rates and incentive policies (Figure 3): that is, no financial incentives, planned financial incentives, and the possible outcomes of financial incentives. According to Prof. Capron, under the model without financial incentives, the donation rate may increase very slowly at the beginning and be lower than the expected or actual results of economic incentives. However, as the public has accepted the need for organ donation and transplants over time, donation rates have increased rapidly after several years to exceed the expected and actual results of economic incentives. Nevertheless, the incentive for organ donation from corpses has always been a concerning issue. The discussion and research of ethical issues are particularly important for the healthy and sustainable development of organ donation and transplants in China as a responsible country that provides organ transplants. Third, conscientious personnel involved in the field of organ donation and transplants should remain acutely attuned to the potential occurrence of organ trafficking and clandestine organ trade activities, with particular emphasis on the context of living organ procurement and transplantation. Implemented in 2007, the Human Organ Transplantation Regulation stipulates that “the recipients of living organs are limited to the spouses, immediate blood relatives or collateral blood relatives within three generations of living organ donors, or those who have evidence to prove that they have formed a kinship relationship with living organ donors through assistance.” On this basis, the Chinese Ministry of Health's 2013 regulation for the standardization of living organ transplantation further stipulates that “living organ donors and recipients are limited to the following relationships: only spouses who have been married for more than 3 years or have children after marriage; direct blood relatives or collateral blood relatives within three generations; and only between adoptive parents and their children, and between stepparents and their stepchildren.” In the realm of organ donation and transplants, the strong professionalism required by this work indicates that the cooperation of all medical personnel is very important. Every responsible doctor and related professional should be highly alert to the possibility of commercial organ trafficking behavior, and take prompt and responsible action when organ donors are found to lack genuine informed consent or evidence of a biological relationship is questionable.

## **12) Questions to be Addressed**

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- 1)What can be done to prevent human trafficking in conflict zones?
  - 2)How organ trafficking and illicit trade in human organs in conflict zones can be stopped?
  - 3)How can drug production and trafficking in conflict zones be prevented?
  - 4)What can be done to break and stop the interlinkages between human, organ and drug trafficking?
  - 5)How can international and regional responses and case studies be used to learn lessons and improve practices?
  - 6)In an era where drug trafficking, organ trafficking, and human trafficking are rampant, what measures can be taken to ensure a better future?
  - 7)How can the ethical dimensions of organ, human, and drug trafficking in war zones be discussed and relevant measures be taken?

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